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UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT
Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v.
Federal Communications
Commission,
U.S.-, 90 D.A.R. 7383,
No. 89-453 (June 27, 1990).
Supreme Court Narrowly Upholds
FCC Minority Preference Policies
In a 5-4 decision, the U.S. Supreme
Court upheld two minority preference
policies established by the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC).
First, it is the FCC's policy to award an
enhancement for minority ownership
and participation in management, which
is weighed together with all other relevant factors in comparing mutually
exclusive applications for license for
new radio or television broadcast stations. Second, the FCC's so-called "distress sale" policy allows a radio or television broadcaster whose qualifications
to hold a license have come into question to transfer that license before the
FCC resolves the matter in a noncomparative hearing, but only if the transferee is a minority enterprise which meets
certain requirements. Metro Broadcasting sought review of an FCC order
awarding a new television license to
Rainbow Broadcasting in a comparative
proceeding, based on the ruling that the
substantial enhancement granted
Rainbow because of its minority ownership outweighed factors favoring Metro.
The FCC adopted these policies in an
attempt to satisfy its obligation under the
Communications Act of 1934 to promote diversification of programming,
taking the position that its past efforts to
encourage minority participation in the
broadcast industry had not resulted in
sufficient broadcast diversity, and that
this situation was detrimental not only to
the minority audience but to all of the
viewing and listening public.
The Court held that these policies do
not violate equal protection principles,
since they bear the imprimatur of longstanding congressional support and
direction and are substantially related to
the achievement of the important governmental objective of broadcast diversity. Writing for the five-member majority,
Justice Brennan stated that the strict
scrutiny test does not apply, because the
FCC's minority ownership programs
"have been specifically approvedindeed, mandated-by Congress," and
the benign race-conscious measures are
constitutionally permissible to the extent
that they serve important governmental
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objectives within the power of Congress
and are substantially related to achievement of those objectives.
Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices
Rehnquist, Scalia, and Kennedy, dissented on grounds that (1) the Constitution
requires that the standard of strict scrutiny be applied to evaluate such racial
classifications; and (2) the minority preference policies were not narrowly tailored to address a compelling state interest.
NINTH CIRCUIT COURT
COURT OF APPEALS
Geary, et al. v. Renne, et al.,
911 F.2d 280, 90 D.A.R. 9032,
No. 88-2875 (August 14, 1990).
Ninth Circuit Strikes Down California's
Ban on Party Endorsements for
Nonpartisan Offices
In this proceeding, plaintiffs were ten
registered voters of the City and County
of San Francisco, an organization of registered voters, and one of that organization's officers. The basis of their complaint was the refusal of the City and
County of San Francisco and the San
Francisco Registrar of Voters to permit
official party and party central committee endorsements to be printed in the
San Francisco Voter Pamphlet prepared
for elections scheduled for June 2 and
November 3, 1987. Defendants based
their refusal to print such endorsements
on the language of Article II, section
6(b) of the California Constitution,
which provides that no political party or
party central committee may endorse,
support or oppose a candidate for nonpartisan office.
In reversing an earlier decision by a
panel of the Ninth Circuit (see CRLR
Vol. 9, No. 4 (Fall 1989) p. 139 for
background information) and affirming
the district court, the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals, en banc, held that Article II,
section 6(b) violates the first and fourteenth amendments of the federal
Constitution. Writing for the majority,
Chief Judge Goodwin concluded that (1)
the state's interest in preserving the nonpartisan nature of California's system of
electing local and judicial officials is not
a compelling state interest; and (2) the
ban on party endorsements is not narrowly tailored to achieve these purposes.
Distinguishing Austin v. Michigan
Chamber of Commerce ___U.S._,
110 S.Ct. 1391 (1990), which upheld
restrictions on independent expenditures
by corporations in state candidate elections, the majority stated that those
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restrictions were aimed at preventing
financial fraud and corruption, whereas
the ban on party endorsements was
directed toward restricting the flow of
political information. Relying on its
prior decision in Eu v. San Francisco
Democratic Cent. Comm., 826 F.2d 814
(9th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 489 U.S. 214
(1989), invalidating a similar ban on
party endorsements in partisan primaries, the court ascribed no significance to the fact that the offices at issue
in Geary were nonpartisan. "The concern in fEu] was with the State's abridgment of the rights of political parties and
their members to exchange ideas and
information, not with the nature of the
elections at issue." The majority also
noted that there are less drastic means
for safeguarding the nonpartisan nature
of local and judicial elections, including
provisions for nonpartisan methods of
nominating candidates for office and
controls on partisan activities of candidates.
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Rymer,
joined by Judges Alarcon and
Fernandez, found that the state has a
compelling interest in the structure of its
nonpartisan government and that Article
II, section 6(b) is essential to preserving
that structure. In a separate dissent,
Judge Alarcon criticized the majority for
failing to consider the evidence in the
record and in California history concerning "the devastating impact party
endorsements can have on the integrity
of local office holders and the independence of the judiciary."
UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURTS
Service Employees Int'l Union v.
Fair Political Practices Commission,
F.Supp.-, 90 D.A.R. 11170,
No. CIV. S-89-433-LKK (Sept. 25,
1990).
Federal Court Invalidates
Proposition 73"s Campaign
Contribution Limits
Just six weeks before election day,
U.S. District Court Judge Lawrence K.
Karlton of the Eastern District of
California struck down the contribution
limits applicable to all campaigns for
election to state and local office established in Proposition 73, passed by the
voters in June 1988. (See CRLR Vol. 9,
No. 4 (Fall 1989) pp. 140-41 and Vol. 8,
No. 2 (Spring 1988) p. 1 for extensive
background information on Propositions
68 and 73, two campaign reform initiatives approved by the electorate in June
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1988.)
Proposition 73 established limitations
on campaign contributions that may be
made or accepted during any fiscal year,
defined as the period between July I and
June 30. It also limited candidates to
raising funds for a particular office, and
set forth procedural requirements
regarding establishment of a campaign
bank account and reporting to the FPPC.
Finally, it prohibited the transfer of
funds between candidates and controlled
committees of a single candidate.
Three incumbent legislators sponsored Proposition 73. In this action (one
of numerous lawsuits seeking to invalidate all or parts of both Propositions 68
and 73), the original plaintiffs-challenging the contribution limits as violative of their first amendment rights of
speech and association-were a number
of incumbent legislators, various campaign committees, labor organizations,
and a contributor to political campaigns.
The Democratic Party also intervened as
a plaintiff, arguing that the provisions of
Proposition 73 which prohibited it from
contributing more than $5,000 to any
candidate in any fiscal year, or from
accepting contributions of more than
$2,500 from any one person in any fiscal year for the purpose of making contributions to a particular candidate, hindered it from engaging in voter registration and membership communication
activities regarding its endorsement of
candidates.
The court engaged in a sequential
analysis: it first examined whether the
challenged provisions of Proposition 73
impinge upon rights protected by the
first amendment; then, it examined
whether there is a sufficiently strong
governmental interest served by the
statute's restriction on those rights;
finally, it determined whether the provisions are "narrowly tailored to the evil
which may be legitimately regulated."
The court first found that Proposition
73's fiscal year contribution limitations
"in and of themselves constitute a burden upon First Amendment activity."
The court noted that the only governmental interests deemed important
enough to outweigh a first amendment
restriction were (1) limiting the actuality
or appearance of corruption in elections;
and (2) limiting the "corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations
of wealth that are accumulated with the
help of the corporate form and that have
little or no correlation to the public's
support for the corporation's political
ideas," from the recently decided Austin
v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce,
U.S._ , 110 S.Ct. 1391 (1990).
Thus, plaintiffs contended that the
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limitations on contributions measured
by fiscal year, rather than by election,
worked an unconstitutional preference
for incumbents and against challengers.
The justification for the fiscal year
structure put forth by defendants was
that it allows any candidate who is successful in the June primary to receive
more contributions in the November
general election from persons who gave
the maximum allowable contributions
for the primary election. In both its 208
findings of fact and its conclusions of
law, the court found that this arrangement provides a major benefit to incumbents-the very evil Proposition 73 purports to ameliorate. Thus, it "clearly
fails the legitimate governmental interest and narrow tailoring test...." The
court then found the fiscal year contribution limitations inseverable from the
contribution limit provisions in general,
and thus struck down all provisions of
Proposition 73 relating to limitations on
campaign contributions.
The court's basic holding is based on
the fact that incumbents are in a position
to solicit and receive $1,000 each fiscal
year from their supporters as they hold
office-building up an intimidating fund
to deter challenge. For a state senator,
this continuous gathering of funds
allows $5,000 from each individual contributor in any given term of office,
since there are five fiscal years within
the four-calendar-year term of a senator.
In contrast, when a challenger appears
during an election year to challenge
such an incumbent, he/she is effectively
subject to a $1,000 limit per individual
contributor. The court found that this
system, in fact, operated to deprive challengers of meaningful opportunity to
compete. The court implied that the limits of Proposition 68, which are based
not on fiscal years but on primary and
general elections, respectively, would
not create the same constitutional problem, since the limits are applied to both
on a more equal practical basis.
The court also invalidated the initiative's ban on transfers of funds between
candidates and controlled committees of
a single candidate. "It is clear that the
ban acts as an expenditure limitation;
such limitations have never been upheld,
save in connection with the expenditures
of corporations."
In the chaos that followed Judge
Karlton's September 25 ruling, the
FPPC announced that it would immediately begin enforcing the similar campaign contribution limits in Proposition
68 as to legislative races. However,
three days after his original ruling,
Judge Karlton stayed it as to legislative
races, thus reimposing Proposition 73's

contribution limits. The original order
striking the limits remained effective as
to statewide races, thus unleashing a
frenzy of fundraising activity and a torrent of campaign contributions to candidates for statewide offices, particularly
the hotly-contested gubernatorial race.
Chemical Specialties Manufacturers
Association, Inc. v. Allenby,
744 F.Supp. 934, 90 D.A.R. 10903,
No. C90-021 I-FMS (September 13,
1990).
Proposition65 Not Preempted by
FederalStatutes
Plaintiff, a trade association whose
members manufacture a variety of
chemical specialty products, filed an
action for declaratory judgment, seeking
a ruling that the warning requirements
of Proposition 65, the Safe Drinking
Water and Toxics Enforcement Act of
1986, are preempted by two federal
statutes-the Federal Fungicide,
Insecticide, and Rodenticide Act
(FIFRA), and the Federal Hazardous
Substances Act (FHSA). The U.S.
District Court for the Northern District
of California found that the issue of
FIFRA preemption was previously
decided in D-Con v. Allenby, 728
F.Supp. 605 (N.D. Cal. 1989); in that
case, the court found that FIFRA
expressly permits state regulation of
pesticide sale and use.
With regard to FHSA, the court concluded that "Congress clearly did not
intend to occupy this entire area of regulation, as evidenced by the fact that
states are expressly allowed certain
functions under both FIFRA and
FHSA." The court also stated that "[n]o
evidence shows the impossibility of
complying with both federal and state
statutes."
CALIFORNIA COURTS
OF APPEAL
Californians for Native Salmon &
Steelhead Ass'n v. California
Dep't of Forestry, et al.,
221 Cal. App. 3d 1419, 90 D.A.R. 7673,
No. A046232 (July 6, 1990).
Action for DeclaratoryRelief
Appropriatein Challenging
Alleged "Patternand Practice"
of Unlawful Conduct by Forestry
Department
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The First District Court of Appeal
recently reversed the trial court's dismissal and reinstated an action for
declaratory relief challenging the
California Department of Forestry's
(CDF) alleged policies regarding two
issues: (1) the time of filing of CDF's
responses to public comments on a timber harvesting plan (THP); and (2) the
evaluation and mitigation in each THP
of the cumulative impact of logging
activities.
In its original complaint, plaintiffs
challenged CDF's approval of a specific
THP in a combined petition for writ of
mandate/complaint for injunctive and
declaratory relief. They sought not only
to vacate the THP approval, but declaratory relief outside the THP at issue concerning a "pattern and practice" of agency conduct allegedly in violation of the
California Environmental Quality Act
(CEQA). During the judicial proceeding, the THP grantee withdrew the THP
and moved for an order dismissing it as
a party. Co-respondents CDF and Board
of Forestry demurred to the complaint,
arguing that the challenges to the THP
were moot and that there was no longer
a justiciable controversy "in that the
pleading refers to unspecified timber
harvest plans and to an unidentified contention or policy of Respondents." The
trial court dismissed the THP grantee
and sustained the demurrer with leave to
amend to make more specific allegations regarding CDF's policies.
Plaintiffs' first amended pleading
was a straight complaint for declaratory
and injunctive relief, alleging and challenging "the pattern and practice of the
California Department of Forestry in
their [sic] approval of timber harvest
plans, both in their failure to evaluate
and respond to comments, and to assess
cumulative impacts as mandated by the
California courts." Specifically, plaintiffs allege that CDF regularly approves
THPs and allows timber operations to
commence without issuing written
responses to significant environmental
objection by the public no more than ten
days from the date the plan is approved,
contrary to the requirements in sections
1037.7 and 1037.8 of the Forest Practice
Rules and CEQA, as interpreted in
EPIC v. Johnson, 170 Cal. App. 3d 604
(1985), and other cases. Further, plaintiffs allege that, in numerous instances,
CDF has failed to address the cumulative impacts of the proposed harvest
along with other past, present and proposed harvests, pursuant to CEQA and
EPIC v. Johnson. Plaintiffs allege a list
of 65 approved THPs as illustrative of
respondents' "procedure" to issue
responses to public comments tardily or
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not at all, and of respondents' having
"consistently ignored" their duty to
assess cumulative impacts. Respondents
demurred to the amended complaint.
The trial court sustained the demurrer,
and plaintiffs appealed.
In reversing and remanding for trial,
the appellate court held that an action
for declaratory relief is a proper vehicle,
noting that the material factual allegations of plaintiffs' complaint have been
admitted by respondents' demurrer.
"Appellants allege and respondents dispute whether CDF is engaged in conduct
or has established policies in violation
of applicable statutes, regulations, and
judicial decisions. Clearly the allegations of appellants' complaint sufficiently set forth an actual controversy over
significant aspects of respondents' legally-mandated duties."
In response to CDF's argument that
plaintiffs are merely expressing dissatisfaction with a series of 65 THP
approvals, the court again noted that
plaintiffs allege a "pattern and practice"
of conduct violative of the law, which
has been admitted by means of respondents' demurrer. The court also rejected
respondents' argument that plaintiffs'
challenge should be by way of a petition
for administrative mandamus; "[a]ppellants...challenge not a specific order or
decision, or even a series thereof, but an
overarching, quasi-legislative policy set
by an administrative agency. Such a policy is subject to review in an action for
declaratory relief."
On September 19, the California
Supreme Court denied respondents'
petition for review. At this writing, this
action is proceeding to trial.
Midpeninsula Citizens for Fair
Housing v. Westwood Investors, et al.,
221 Cal. App. 3d 1377, 90 D.A.R. 7614,
No. H005191 (July 2, 1990).
Sixth Appellate District Upholds Broad
Standing to Halt Unlawful Business
Practice
Following the lead of the First
District Court of Appeal, the Sixth
District Court of Appeal held that nonaggrieved persons may sue for injunctive relief under California's unfair comBusiness and
petition statute,
Professions Code section 17204. In
Midpeninsula, a nonprofit organization
sued under the Unruh Civil Rights Act,
Civil Code section 51 et seq., and the
unfair competition laws to enjoin an
apartment complex rental policy which
limited occupancy to one person per
bedroom. The court found that
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Midpeninsula is not a "person aggrieved" within the meaning of the
Unruh Act, nor does Midpeninsula have
the representative standing to sue under
that Act. Citing extensively to
Consumers Union of United States, Inc.
v. Fisher Development, Inc., 208 Cal.
App. 3d 1433 (1989), the court held
that-even though the organization
lacked standing under the Unruh Act-it
could still obtain injunctive relief under
the state's unfair competition laws,
which provide that "any person acting
for the interests of itself, its members or
the general public" is entitled to bring
an action for injunctive relief from any
"unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business
practice."
As in the Consumers Union case, the
court noted that courts have consistently
given a broad interpretation to the standing provisions of the unfair competition
laws, finding that the narrower standing
requirements of the Unruh Act coincide
with the treble damages and attorneys'
fees available under that Act, while only
injunctive relief is available under the
broader Business and Professions Code
section 17204.
Bily v. Arthur Young & Co.,
222 Cal. App. 3d 289, 90 D.A.R. 8307,
No. H003695 (July 20, 1990).
Independent Auditors Liable to Third
PartyInvestors for Professional
Negligence
In a case arising from the collapse of
the Osborne Computer Corporation, the
Sixth District Court of Appeal upheld
damages awarded against Arthur Young
& Company for its failure to exercise
reasonable care as an independent auditor.
In 1981, Osborne engaged Arthur
Young & Company to audit its financial
statements; plaintiffs subsequently relied
on the unqualified audit opinion issued
by Arthur Young in January 1983 in
making substantial purchases of
Osborne stock. Because of significant
weaknesses in Osborne's internal
accounting procedures, the financial
statements were overly optimistic; in
1983, Osborne went into bankruptcy,
resulting in substantial losses for the
investors. The investors sued Arthur
Young for professional negligence.
In upholding the damages awarded to
most of the investors, the court rejected
Arthur Young's argument that the duty
of care owed by independent auditors
should be defined solely by generally
accepted auditing standards (GAAS)
and generally accepted accounting pro-
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cedures (GAAP). Instead, the court held
that GAAS and GAAP served only as
"some evidence" of the proper standard
of care, and that "it is the general rule
that adherence to a relevant custom or
practice does not necessarily establish
the actor has met the standard of care."
The court explained that restricting an
auditor's duty strictly to GAAS and
GAAP "would inappropriately entrust to
the accountancy profession itself the
balancing of interests implicit in any
determination of duty and breach."
The court also rejected Arthur
Young's request to severely narrow the
scope of persons to whom auditors owe
a duty of care. Citing International
Mortgage Co. v. John P. Butler
Accountancy Corporation, 177 Cal.
App. 3d 806 (1986), the court held that
independent auditors are liable to "those
third parties who reasonably and foreseeably rely on negligently prepared and
issued unqualified audited financial
statements, regardless of whether the
third parties were in contractual privity
with, or their reliance was actually foreseen by, the auditor."
The court also held that the trial court
correctly denied Arthur Young's motion
to exclude all evidence concerning its
failure to disclose material weaknesses
in Osborne's internal accounting controls, finding that independent auditors
are required to assess the sufficiency of
an audit client's internal accounting controls and, where material weaknesses
exist, to test the accuracy of information
provided by the client and inform the
senior management, board of directors,
and the board's audit committee of the
material weaknesses. The court held that
evidence of Arthur Young's nondisclosure was relevant to whether the auditor
"failed to exercise professional skill sufficient to discover, or had discovered but
for whatever reason had mischaracterized or disregarded, the fact that
Osborne Computer Corporation lacked
adequate internal accounting controls,
and in any event had failed to apply
auditing tests and procedures sufficient
to compensate for the lack of internal
controls...."
The InternationalMortgage and Bily
cases are likely to be important precedents in litigation arising from the collapse of California savings and loans.
One important aspect of many insolvent
S&Ls is the failure of independent auditors to either detect or take appropriate
actions to correct weak internal accounting controls by corrupt or poorly managed thrifts.
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Bjornestad v. Hulse, et al.,
223 Cal. App. 3d 507, 90 D.A.R. 10895,
No. C007526 (September 5, 1990).
Water District'sOne-Parcel,One-Vote
Election Scheme Violates Equal
Protection
In this proceeding, the Sixth District
Court of Appeal held Water Code section 30700.6 to be unconstitutional
under the equal protection clauses of the
California and federal constitutions.
Section 30700.6 provides that only one
designated landowner per parcel in the
Sierra Lakes County Water District
-regardless of his/her residency-may
vote in a district election or be a member of the district's governing board of
directors.
The court found that the county
water district had broad public function
and governmental powers which distinguished it from the districts in caselaw
where property-based restrictions have
been upheld, and concluded that the
interests of nonlandowning residents
were such that they could not be
deprived of their right to vote.

alike" and was "intended to establish a
single statewide body of law pertaining
to the financing of election campaigns;"
and (3) the ballot materials accompanying Proposition 73 specifically discuss
the issue of public campaign financing
by local governments. On this basis, the
court concluded that "the express language of section 85300 as well as its
legislative history manifest a statewide
concern with campaign financing which
perforce prevails over conflicting local
provisions."
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County of Sacramento, et al. v. Fair
Political Practices Commission,
222 Cal. App. 3d 687, 90 D.A.R. 8525,
No. C005845 (July 27, 1990).
Local CampaignFinancingOrdinance
Preemptedby Proposition73
In this proceeding, the Third District
Court of Appeal held that Proposition
73's ban on the use of public funds for
political campaigns (codified in
Government Code section 85300) prevails over a Sacramento County ordinance providing for limited public
financing of supervisorial campaigns.
Proposition 73, enacted by the state
electorate at the June 1988 general election, amended the Political Reform Act
of 1974, and provides in part that no
public officer shall expend and no candidate shall accept any public moneys
for the purpose of seeking elective
office. Section 15-B of the Sacramento
Charter provides for partial public
financing of contests for county elective
offices for those candidates who agree
to certain limits on campaign expenditures.
Writing for a unanimous court,
Justice Puglia found that (1) "the
integrity of election contests is a longstanding matter of statewide interest;"
(2) "[bly its terms Proposition 73
applies to local and statewide elections
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